<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en"><generator uri="https://jekyllrb.com/" version="3.10.0">Jekyll</generator><link href="https://ishanbhatt42.github.io/writing/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" /><link href="https://ishanbhatt42.github.io/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" hreflang="en" /><updated>2026-11-07T16:49:14-05:00</updated><id>https://ishanbhatt42.github.io/writing/feed.xml</id><title type="html">Ishan Bhatt | Writing</title><subtitle>Ishan Bhatt is a PhD student in Business Economics at Harvard University.</subtitle><author><name>Ishan Bhatt</name><email>ishanbhatt@g.harvard.edu</email></author><entry><title type="html">Don’t Just Legalize Housing. Place Limits on Local Regulation Altogether.</title><link href="https://ishanbhatt42.github.io/writing/2026-07-29-adu-preemption/" rel="alternate" type="text/html" title="Don’t Just Legalize Housing. Place Limits on Local Regulation Altogether." /><published>2026-07-29T00:00:00-04:00</published><updated>2026-07-29T00:00:00-04:00</updated><id>https://ishanbhatt42.github.io/writing/adu-preemption</id><content type="html" xml:base="https://ishanbhatt42.github.io/writing/2026-07-29-adu-preemption/"><![CDATA[<p><small>This essay summarizes my findings from <a href="/files/paper_adu_preemption.pdf">my working paper</a>.</small></p>

<p>A decade ago, almost nobody in California received a permit for a backyard home. 
Then, the state’s suite of permitting reforms in 2016 caused a surge. Now, 
accessory dwelling units (ADUs) – small, self-contained units built in 
backyards, garages, and basements of existing residential properties – are 
nearly <a href="https://cayimby.org/reports/california-adu-reform-a-retrospective/">one in five new homes</a> 
in the state. I argue that a central ingredient in the success of the reforms 
was the limits the Golden State imposed on local regulation.</p>

<p><strong>What California Did.</strong> Local land use regulations suppress new housing 
construction, so states aiming to increase housing supply are often interested 
in preempting them. Rather than remove one local barrier at a time, California 
established the <em>maximum</em> standards a locality could apply to an ADU. With few 
exceptions, any ADU meeting the state’s standards was permitted by-right 
(without case-by-case review) and a locality could not layer on additional 
standards. I call this a regulatory ceiling.<sup id="fnref:1" role="doc-noteref"><a href="#fn:1" class="footnote" rel="footnote">1</a></sup></p>

<p>Regulatory ceilings are promising because localities can impose 
<a href="https://www.planning.org/publications/document/9247472/">a wide array of barriers to new housing</a>. 
Zoning, design standards, setback requirements, impact fees, and case-by-case 
permit review impose barriers to new housing “<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3792544">by a thousand cuts</a>.” 
Localities can also respond to the removal of one barrier with the imposition of another. 
One California city responded to state duplex legalization by requiring that 
qualifying lots contain <a href="https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/research-and-policy/state-law-local-interpretation-senate-bill-9/">three mature trees</a>. 
A legislative aide who worked on the reforms described removing barriers 
one by one as a “cat-and-mouse” game with local authorities. 
A regulatory ceiling circumvents this entirely.</p>

<p>California’s reforms provided a natural experiment to test my argument. 
The 2016 package of ADU reforms created a broad regulatory ceiling for ADUs on 
parcels with a single-family home; multi-family parcels (duplexes, triplexes, 
fourplexes) were still subject to substantial local control. 
For the most part, single-issue reforms in the 
package – like lifting parking requirements near transit or streamlining fire 
sprinkler requirements – applied to both single- 
and multi-family parcels. It was only in 2020 that the state extended the 
ceiling to multi-family parcels.<sup id="fnref:2" role="doc-noteref"><a href="#fn:2" class="footnote" rel="footnote">2</a></sup> Thus, to understand how much the regulatory 
ceiling drove an increase in permitting, we can compare these two parcel types 
over this period. If the ceiling matters, we should see permitting surge on 
single-family parcels after 2016 and then see multi-family parcels surge in 
the same way after 2020. Assembling permit data from Los Angeles and San 
Francisco, this is exactly what I found.</p>

<p><img src="/images/writing/adu-preemption/adu_figure.svg" alt="ADU figure" /></p>

<p>By 2020, the percentage of single-family parcels with an ADU permitted 
had risen to 1.5%, 1.2 percentage points higher than multi-family parcels. 
After 2020, the pattern reverses: multi-family permitting rates jump and 
their growth begins to match the growth single-family parcels experienced 
after 2016. The timing of these surges is evidence of the
regulatory ceiling’s effect.</p>

<p>Further analysis shows that the effect of the regulatory ceiling on ADU 
permitting is twice as large as the effect of removing parking requirements.<sup id="fnref:3" role="doc-noteref"><a href="#fn:3" class="footnote" rel="footnote">3</a></sup> 
Additional evidence that the ceiling mattered comes from the fact that many 
ADUs appear to be just less than 1,200 square feet, the size threshold below 
which state protection applies. This suggests that builders who might have 
otherwise built larger ADUs are building smaller ones to stay inside the 
protections provided by the regulatory ceiling.</p>

<p><strong>Lessons for Policymaking.</strong> Many states are now drafting 
ADU legislation, and more are considering some preemption of local land use 
regulations. The lesson from California’s ADU experience is that reforms that 
legalize housing but leave localities free to attach their own conditions 
fail to produce additional housing, as California’s own experience with 
<a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1V5gt4SHMaWOCz64ho4N-XTYvA1cXz2Ll4cmc2yF6bVQ/edit?tab=t.0">past ADU reform shows</a>. 
Successful preemption of local land use regulation may instead require placing 
a ceiling on local authority.</p>

<div class="footnotes" role="doc-endnotes">
  <ol>
    <li id="fn:1" role="doc-endnote">
      <p>I’m adapting language from the <a href="https://nyulawreview.org/issues/volume-82-number-6/asymmetrical-regulation-risk-preemption-and-the-floor-ceiling-distinction/">federalism literature</a> on “ceiling preemption”. <a href="#fnref:1" class="reversefootnote" role="doc-backlink">&#8617;&#xfe0e;</a></p>
    </li>
    <li id="fn:2" role="doc-endnote">
      <p>Like the 2016 reforms, most other parts of the 2020 reform package applied equally to single- and multi-family parcels. <a href="#fnref:2" class="reversefootnote" role="doc-backlink">&#8617;&#xfe0e;</a></p>
    </li>
    <li id="fn:3" role="doc-endnote">
      <p>California prevented localities from imposing parking requirements on ADUs built within a half mile of a transit stop. <a href="#fnref:3" class="reversefootnote" role="doc-backlink">&#8617;&#xfe0e;</a></p>
    </li>
  </ol>
</div>]]></content><author><name>Ishan Bhatt</name><email>ishanbhatt@g.harvard.edu</email></author><summary type="html"><![CDATA[California’s backyard-home boom shows us how states should design preemption of local land use regulation.]]></summary><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://ishanbhatt42.github.io/images/writing/adu-preemption/adu_figure.png" /><media:content medium="image" url="https://ishanbhatt42.github.io/images/writing/adu-preemption/adu_figure.png" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" /></entry></feed>